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As a result, he rather supports a healthy plurality of languages, which affords different tools for each new aim. Therefore, according to Rorty , the old question about our natural or cultural nature became irrelevant or sterile, and science cannot or should not provide us with a definitive answer about what we really are. From this post-positivistic perspective of science, the latter has worn-out its usefulness for political ends because it is not the foundation of culture, and it is neither an example of social cooperation nor public deliberation different from any other discipline.

If there are no universal structures of reality, science becomes a set of traits of power arrangements that can be desirable or undesirable according to different purposes, and in natural or social science their genealogical narratives are useful for lightening and valuing means as well as ends. In this new light we can explore scientific narratives, structures and their close connections to social development by exposing different key cultural features that condition and predetermine it. At the same time, we can also show how some scientific vocabularies justified a specific political project, legitimized by putative traditional scientific objectivity and rationality.

However, even though many authors have been exploring and recognize science as a value-laden activity, 4 many of them insist on an external role of non-epistemic values in the stages of science. This external-internal distinction in scientific development implies that scientific development demands a rational critique independent of the social context, and subsequently, this context is only contingently involved in it. According to her, non-epistemic values are logically needed for reasoning in science, even in the internal states of the process.

This allows her to argue that there is nothing necessary about the link between axiological neutrality and objectivity, so that we can discard the value-free meaning of the latter Douglas Moreover, such a perspective enables her to develop a conception of objectivity in science taking into account different scientific virtues in different situations, just as Rorty does. Thus, his view of science implies that it is not philosophically different from the rest of culture in any meaningful way.

In it, he states that there are no global criteria for deciding which beliefs or principles of inference have epistemic priority. Justification in science is relative to a specific context specified by the questions to be answered. Just as Rorty, he rejects foundationalist approaches in epistemology and he contends an anti-essentialist view about theories.

As a result, there is no special set of rules with an inherent epistemological status Kincaid As both of them state, there is no argument independent of success for interpreting science as greater comprehensiveness of reality. Moreover, prediction and control as signs of reality ignores other fundamental dimensions of reality, and it easily hides social, ethical or political possibilities embodied in them Lacey It also shows what Cornel West named post-structuralist resonances, but complementing it with an insightful perspective of scientific activity and its legitimation.

At the end of there were two different well-founded mathematical structures that accounted for atomic phenomena: the wave and matrix mechanics. This scenario was completely confusing for physicists because Nature seemed to have an irrational and inconsistent behavior. Eventually, it became clear that quantum equations lack an interpretation using the ordinary and classical concepts and images Cassidy In this context, Bohr elaborated the Principles of Complementarity to provide Quantum Theory with a new logical and conceptual framework for interpreting atomic events.

However, they are necessary but insufficient conditions to explain its occurrence. Indeed, through his writings after Bohr develops his original philosophical perspective concerning his general conceptions of nature, experience, language, phenomena or knowledge, as well as his conceptions of objectivity and truth.

Therefore, a conceptual framework does not have a structure or configuration that cannot be modified. For him, science does not look for an a priori and determined reality, but it develops methods to expand and arrange human experience in a consistent and unambiguous way Bohr This is the basis of objective knowledge. He is also convinced that we need classical categories of wave and particle to make an intuitive description of quantum events, because our necessary and normal forms of perception are in the classical language Feyerabend These general ideas allowed him to develop the idea of Complementarity.

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Some scholars of Bohr have established different influences from psychology and philosophy that allowed him to formulate this Principle. He also conceives that continuity and discontinuity are incompatible necessities of spirit. In his Principles of Psychology he states a principle of complementarity between conscious and subconscious, also in a way that is analogous to the Bohrian complementarity. Still, Bohr, as well as his colleague Werner Heisenberg, has an empiricist attitude in which Quantum Theory only explains or accounts for observable events, so there is no ontology beyond measurable entities.

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This attitude has often been connected to a Pragmatist criterion of truth in the Copenhagen Interpretation. Similarly, these examples show that justification comes from particular rules that are followed in a specific context. The best evidence for this statement is the permanent opposition that Complementarity has faced and the diverse interpretations in conflict that Quantum Mechanics has had so far. Although the results are controversial, an important part of these studies use the Foucaultian relation between truth and power to account for the economical and ideological factors which promoted this model.

According to Lily E. Kay , the Foundation had, on the one hand, an economic interest in the nuclear model of inheritance for pushing the productivity growth through crossbreeding of plants and animals, and on the other, an ideological interest for achieving a social control through inheritance to guide human behaviour according to a system of Protestant and conservative values.

The Foundation and some groups close to it were looking to realize a world of social prosperity and progress using human engineering. What the Foucauldians and Derrideans in American universities fail to notice, he argues, is how important the notions of common values and hope, of national pride, are for Americans. It is, Rorty argues, an important part of their self-description.

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But when the academic left argues against the values themselves, it is in fact denying people of the hope for a better future. But just as too little self-respect makes it difficult for a person to display moral courage, so insufficient national pride makes energetic and effective debate about national policy unlikely'. When the CIS, Similarly, when a nation is without pride, without a narrative of progress and virtues, it cannot make sense of its faults.

Rorty is not, however, arguing that the nation can be thought of as an individual with a sense of self-worth. The nation is just another moral community, a collection of individuals involved in a common project.

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But this project is, at least in how Rorty understands the United States, a major part of these individuals' own self-description. Recall that for Rorty, one's dignity is intertwined with the dignity of his moral community, with what makes that community better than others. Rorty links this notion of identity with his account of morality. In an essay titled 'Justice as larger loyalty', he argues that we cannot think of morality as a set of abstract, impersonal laws that one obeys.

His argument, following Annette Baier's Moral Prejudices, claims that morality springs not from reason, but from the sentiments. It is first a reciprocal trust among the members of one's family, the people one knows the most and forms the major part of his socialisation. It is only through the expansion of such sentiments to larger groups — one's extended family, friends, city, nation, or species — that one sees a reason to behave morally towards them. Borrowing from Walzer, Rorty argues that as these groups get bigger, it is likely that their place in one's self description would be smaller: 'you know more about your family than about your village, more about your village than about your nation, more about your nation than about humanity as a whole'.

Nussbaum, Eagleton, Geras and others argue that Rorty is inconsistent. If one can expand his moral sentiments so dramatically, to open the boundaries of what he considers being his moral community to include all members of the American nation, why is it not possible to identify with humanity as a whole? As Geras argues, 'it is just not credible that the significant threshold in this matter, where compassion and solicitude will go no further, lies somewhere beyond several hundred million people'.

As he explicitly writes, 'my position entails that feelings of solidarity are necessarily a matter of which similarities and dissimilarities strike us as salient, and that such salience is a function of a historically contingent final vocabulary'.

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It is mere historical contingency that for Americans in the late twentieth century, being an American resonates strongly with one's moral sensitivities, while being human less so. Rorty's argument against the radical left is, as I understand it, that the identity 'American' is useful, because it is the widest possible in our current moral vocabulary. This view is not incompatible with cosmopolitanism, and indeed, Rorty is a firm supporter of a global liberal polity.

In one of many examples, he describes his hope for 'a specific kind of cosmopolitan human future: the image of a planetwide Geras, p. PMN, p. As human dignity is about being part of a moral community, Rorty does 'not see much point in saying that they [all humans] now, before such a society has been achieved, all equal in dignity Let's try to figure out what kind of utopia we want, and let the truths about us be whatever we have to believe in order to work together for its creation. To put it crudely, let your view of human dignity fall out from your politics; don't milk your politics out of such a view'.

The question to be asked is how he suggests attaining this ideal. Rorty first attempt to address this question was in his essay 'Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism'. It is in this essay that he first suggests that human dignity is not an intrinsic attribute of humans, but a localised and historicised feature of belonging to a moral community.

One of the objections to this claim is, as Rorty presents it, That on my view a child found wandering in the woods, the remnant of a slaughtered nation whose temples have been razed and whose books have been burned, has no share in human dignity. This is indeed a consequence, but it does not follow that she may be treated like an animal. Nashville and London: Vanderbilt University Press, p. In other words, it is not necessary to think that there exists something like 'human dignity' outside of historical moral communities.

It is sufficient to accept that our own, Western and liberal culture takes universal human dignity as a basic premise. This solution is problematic for several reasons and, in my opinion, unconvincing. First, Rorty is evading the fact that the history of the West, despite the values of the Judeo-Christian tradition and of enlightenment liberalism, is ripe with examples of treating people outside the moral community as less than people slavery, crusades, etc.

It is peculiar, then, that he sees that tradition as a sufficient basis to treat the lost child morally. Second, I agree with David Hollinger that Rorty's example is an extremely rare and unrealistic case. In a sense, it is easier for Rorty to consider a child without a culture as a potential member of the moral community than someone who is of culture which is foreign or even antagonistic.

For to achieve the goal of a global moral community, it is obvious that non-Western cultures would also have to somehow accept that the expansion of their moral boundaries is a desired goal. In his Amnesty lecture, titled 'Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality', Rorty argues that moral philosophy has for too long focused on the 'rather rare figure of the psychopath', the person who has no concern for other human beings but himself. Philosophers have tried to convince the psychopath Thrasymachus or the rational choice calculator that through reason one can find an answer to the question 'why should I be moral?

But in doing so, moral philosophy ignored 'the much more common case: the person whose treatment of a rather narrow range of featherless bipeds is morally impeccable, but who remains indifferent to the suffering of those outside this range, the ones he thinks of as pseudo- humans'.

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Elsewhere he writes: 'Moral development in the individual, and moral progress in the human species as a whole, is a matter of re-marking human selves so as to enlarge the variety of the relationships which constitute those selves'. It is only by telling 'long, sad, sentimental stories' that people are able to See for example, Haber, p.

Dewey', PCP, p. It is important to notice that this process of moral progress — the expansion of our moral community to include people previously considered quasi-human — is for Rorty the way things work both within the national borders and beyond. There is no qualitative difference in Rorty's eyes between stretching the moral imagination to include the 'others' within one's own nation women, racial and religious minorities, homosexuals and a more global expansion to include members of other nations, speakers of other languages, or perhaps non-human animals.

The latter is more difficult than the former not because of any substantive difference, but because the levels of interaction and overlapping values that facilitate sympathy are not as salient. The expansion of the moral community is achieved not by reason, but by imagination. First, one can argue that the basic premise of the discussion is wrong.

Susan Mendus writes that 'one of the less honest features of Rorty's account that he tries to force upon us a choice between seeing others as like ourselves and concluding that their suffering does not matter'. Rorty, he argues, wants to separate the question 'do you believe and desire what we believe and desire? Bacon argues that 'on [Rorty's] view, there is a two-way relation between identification and suffering.

We might attend the suffering of others because we identify with them, but equally, we might come to identify with them because we notice their suffering'. It is true that 'we might come to identify with them because we notice their suffering', but Bacon's argument would be better if he had put more emphasis on the word 'might'.